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Academic reputations and dust-jacket comments can be misleading,1 but
when I first picked up Regulating Covert Action and read the high praise on
the back of the jacket from both the very liberal Princeton Professor Richard
A. Falk and the comparably conservative former U.N. Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick - both of whom I hold in high regard - I anticipated a delightful
and rewarding read. I was not disappointed.
W. Michael Reisman is the Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of
Jurisprudence at Yale Law School and ranks among the world's foremost
scholars of international law. A close colleague of the legendary Professor
Myres S. McDougal, who is regarded by many as the world's preeminent
scholar in the field of international law, Reisman's writings typify the "New
Haven School" of jurisprudence, which focuses less on the textual analysis of
legal instruments than on ascertaining the expectations of governing elites on
the permissibility of policy options.2 In this volume, Professor Reisman is
joined as a co-author by his former student, James E. Baker, who adds the
perspective gleaned from working for several years as a legislative assistant
to Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan
following his service as a Marine Corps officer. Since co-authoring the book,
Baker has worked as an attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser to the
Department of State, with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, and on the legal staff of the National Security Council.
Regulating Covert Action is, by any standard, an excellent book, and it
t Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, U.S. Naval War College. A co-founder in
1981 of the University of Virginia's Center for National Security Law, the reviewer has also served as
Counsel to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board at the White House, as President of the U.S.
Institute of Peace, and for several terms as Chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Law and
National Security. The views expressed are his own.
1. See Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A
Review Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 903, 903 (1994).
2. On the assumption that many readers of the Journal will be quite familiar with Professor
Reisman's jurisprudential approach, I have refrained from a more detailed summary. Readers seeking a
brief introduction are urged to read chapter two of the volume being reviewed. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN
& JAMEs E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTIcES, CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT
COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW 17-25 (1992). A more extensive exposition
of what has been termed the "New Haven School" of jurisprudence can be found in MYRES S.
McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961).
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deserves a far wider readership than its narrow title might attract. The book
provides both a valuable summary of a number of controversial operations3
and an excellent overview of how the legal regime governing the low-intensity
use of armed force has developed under the U.N. Charter.4 Indeed, one of
the few arguable shortcomings of Regulating Covert Action may be its title.
Most of the volume is equally applicable to overt coercive efforts to influence
foreign governments, yet inapplicable to many activities properly encompassed
by the broad term "covert action."' Furthermore, some of the most important
"regulations" governing U.S. covert operations do not appear in this volume
because they are classified.6
I. DEFINING "COVERT ACTION"
Unfortunately, the nature of most "covert" operations is largely
misunderstood. The typical "covert action" does not involve the threat or use
of military force against foreign States,7 and many do not involve "coercion"
of any sort. The widespread misunderstanding is not all that surprising,
however, as most "special activities" remain unknown to the public. Those
that are "leaked" and judged by the media to be worthy of significant press
coverage tend to be only the most controversial. While only a tiny fraction of
CIA operations over the years have involved efforts to assassinate foreign
leaders8 or to finance paramilitary armies to replace objectionable foreign
3. REisMAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 48-67.
4. Id. at 38-48, 78-115.
5. Exec. Order No. 12,333 (December 4, 1981) uses the term "special activities" rather than "covert
action," and provides this definition:
Special activities means activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives
abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not
apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are
not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media
and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or
related support functions.
Exec. Order No. 12,333, pt. 3.4(h), 3 C.F.R., 1982 Comp. reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
Congress defines "covert action" as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad where it is intended that the role of the United States
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly .... " Several enumerated exclusions qualify
this definition. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, sec. 602, § 503(e), 105 Stat. 429, 443
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (Supp. V 1993)) (amending National Security Act of 1947, § 501).
The Department of Defense considers "covert operations" to be those "[o]perations which are so planned
and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from
clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on
concealment of the operation." U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JT. PUB. No. 1-02, DIcTIONARY OF MILrrARY
AND ASSOCIAaD TERMS 95-96 (1989).
6. Unless the process has changed significantly since I left the White House a little more than a
decade ago, each agency within the Intelligence Community is required to draft detailed internal
regulations and procedures that are submitted, inter alia, to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
at the Department of Justice for approval by the Attorney General prior to being implemented. Such
regulations are taken seriously within the Community and play an important role in "regulating" covert
action and other intelligence functions; however, because they are classified, the Reisman-Baker book
could not assess them.
7. The authors note that "paramilitary operations account for a relatively small part of the total
number of covert operations." REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 128.
8. A major difficulty in discussing this issue is the definition of "assassination." Id. at 70, 127. Most
definitions of the term include either the word "murder" or the legal elements thereof, and by that
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governments, 9 these kinds of "covert operations" receive the greatest
publicity. Much of the public, therefore, associates the term with activities
widely viewed as nefarious"° and contrary to democratic values.
Many also harbor a perception that such operations are conducted covertly
because the government knows they would be rightly condemned if made
public and a corresponding belief that secrecyper se is somehow incompatible
with American democratic traditions.1 ' Nevertheless, secrecy is often
definition I share the authors' view that "assassination should be viewed as an unlawful covert action and
should not be given any color of law." Id. at 70. When the Church Committee examined this issue, its
basic conclusion was that the CIA had over the years been involved in a very small number of
"assassination" operations, several of which were directed at Cuban dictator Fidel Castro and were
unsuccessful, and a few other operations that ultimately resulted in the deaths of foreign officials (e.g.,
Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam and Salvador Alliende in Chile). In both the Diem and Alliende
incidents, however, there was no clear evidence that the Agency either encouraged or expected the officials
to be killed. Today, part 2.11 of Exec. Order 12,333 (Dec. 4, 1981) expressly provides that "[no person
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, assassination." Exec. Order 12,333, supra note 5, at pt. 2.11. A distinction should be made, in my
view, between politically-motivated "murder" and the intentional targeting of a political leader engaged
in an aggressive war. In the latter case, the victim State has a legal right to use necessary and proportional
lethal force in self-defense. See Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be A Crime?, WASH. POST,
Oct. 7, 1990, at DI (commentary and opinion).
9. While U.S. support for paramilitary covert operations is widely believed to be unique to the Cold
War era, see, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILTY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH at ix (1993), in reality, the first such operation dates back at least to 1804, when
Thomas Jefferson was President and James Madison his Secretary of State. This operation was apparently
the brainchild of James Leander Cathcart, U.S. ex-Consul to Tripoli, who in a June 29, 1801, letter to
William Eaton, U.S. Consul to Tunis, argued that the only way of preventing the Bey of Tripoli (Joseph
Bashaw) from preying upon U.S. merchant shipping in the Mediterranean would be "by effecting a
revolution in favor of Hamet the Bashaw[']s Brother." Letter from James Leander Cathcart to William
Eaton (June 29, 1801), in 1 NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES WARS wrrH THE
BARBARY PowERs, 1785-1801, at 494 (1939). Eaton subsequently raised the idea with Madison, and the
United States secretly raised a small army of Greek and Arab mercenaries who launched an attack against
Tripoli in 1804. Tripoli had already declared war against the United States over our failure to pay annual
tribute for the protection of our commerce. The operation, which was a complete success, is discussed in
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOiaEIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POwER: THE ORIGINS 217-21
(1976).
10. While most Americans would (hopefully) agree that their government ought not, as a general
principle, destabilize regimes with which it disagrees, most reported CIA interventions are considerably
more complex than they appear at first glance. Typically, the CIA became involved only in response to
perceived foreign (typically Soviet or Cuban) intervention, and often not until perceived Leninist "clients"
had taken repressive measures against democratic opposition groups. The objective, in many instances,
was simply to "level the playing field" by offsetting the perceived external Leninist influence. To be sure,
many motives may exist for a covert operation of this nature. Thus, Reisman and Baker note that the 1953
covert operation to undermine Mohammed Mossadegh's regime in Iran occurred after Mossadegh had
dissolved parliament, "rigged" an election, and refused to surrender power when dismissed by the Shah.
Further, Moscow had been working actively for years trying to gain control over oil-rich Iran, and
Mossadegh was believed to be under the strong influence of the Tudeh (Communist) Party. It is also true,
however, that Mossadegh posed a threat to U.S. commercial oil interests. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note
2, at 49-50. Similarly, the United States did not decide to intervene against the Marxist-Leninist
Sandinistas in Nicaragua until it became clear that they were actively seeking to overthrow several
neighboring governments. See infra at notes 47-71; see also ROBERT F. TURNER, NICARAGUA V. UNITED
STATES: A LOOK AT THE FAcTS 7-21 (1987).
11. Professor John Hart Ely, former Dean of Stanford Law School, argues that, even during times
of congressionally authorized "war," it is unconstitutional for the President to keep significant campaigns
secret "unless there is a compelling military justification. . . ." ELY, supra note 9, at 199 n.60. In fact,
secrecy was recognized as an important element of effective foreign policy even before the drafting of the
U.S. Constitution (an act which itself, one might note, was carried out under strict rules of secrecy - with
Madison later commenting that no Constitution would have been possible under an open process). For a
brief discussion of the importance of secrecy in the eyes of the Founding Fathers and its large role in early
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required to protect sensitive foreign sources of intelligence information," to
conceal particularly effective methods of intelligence gathering, 3 or even to
promote a peaceful resolution of a potentially explosive great-power
confrontation by allowing an adversary to make policy concessions without
"losing face" before the entire world. 14 Indeed, Reisman and Baker make a
persuasive case that a covert operation might have been preferable to the 1989
U.S. military intervention in Panama ("Operation Just Cause") that led to the
arrest of General Manuel Noriega"
The costs, in terms of lives, matiriel and social and economic disruption, to the United
States, to particular target states and to non-targeted third states might be substantially less
if the modality of-implementation selected were in whole or in part covert. Consider, for
a moment, the costs of expelling General Noriega from Panama in October, 1989, by means
of an internally-initiated but externally and covertly supported coup, as opposed to the
destructive economic war of attrition with the same objectives that reduced much of Panama
to economic rubble before the full-scale military invasion in December finished the job."
If the public were aware of the intelligence community's undisclosed
efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or to
reduce the influence of international drug cartels, organized crime, or terrorist
American constitutional practice, see Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause, supra note
1, at 921-29.
12. In Federalist No. 64, John Jay observed:
There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing
it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery .... [Aind there doubtless are many...
who would rely on the secrecy of the president, but who would not confide in that of the
senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention have done well
therefore in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the president must in
forming them act by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be able to manage the
business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest.
THE FEDERALisT No. 64, at 434-35 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
13. For example, overhead platforms (satellites) that are far more capable than a powerful adversary
realizes may provide the United States with information justifying a covert operation. If the United States
concealed its involvement, the adversary would be less likely to deduce that certain activities thought secret
were in fact being monitored by the United States and would be less likely to take precautions that would
deny the United States potentially vital information thereafter.
14. This was cleirly a motive for the United States' covert response to Soviet and Cuban military
adventurism in Angola in 1975. In the wake of the U.S. decision (mandated by congressional military aid
cuts) to abandon the noncommunist peoples of Indochina to Pol Pot and Hanoi's Stalinist regime - a
government which continues to rank among the world's dozen worst human rights violators - Moscow
perceived the change of governments in Portugal and the resulting decision to surrender colonial control
of Angola as a "target of opportunity." Had the United States overtly challenged Soviet actions in Angola,
Moscow might well have felt that its credibility with various revolutionary regimes and movements would
suffer too greatly if it "gave in" to American pressures. By moving covertly - and Angola is a good
example of an operation that was known to a key target (the USSR) but (until disclosed by members of
Congress) "covert" to most of the rest of the world - the United States was able to put pressure on Soviet
policymakers without greatly increasing the costs to Moscow of a policy shift.
15. REIsMAN & BMMAR, supra note 2, at 8. To be sure, one might quarrel with the authors' choice
of hypothetical, as there was hardly widespread agreement about the "legality" of Operation Just Cause
(which one of my Pentagon lawyer friends describes as "Operation Just Because"). Indeed, I have
personally been critical of the Panama intervention in terms of its compliance with international law. Such
developments as the Security Council's approval of armed intervention in Haiti, however, may ultimately
establish a new legal regime permitting armed external intervention (ideally multilateral) for the purpose
of restoring democracy. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. For efforts to defend the Panama
intervention, see, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panana Was A Lawful Response to Tyranny,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama,
29 CoLuM. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 281 (1991).
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groups, a quite different attitude toward covert operations might well exist.
For example, when American hostages were seized in Tehran in early
November of 1979, Canada reportedly carried out a "covert operation"
designed to help several American diplomats who had evaded capture and
taken refuge in the Canadian Embassy to escape Iran and return to the United
States. Canada understandably wished to conceal its role in the rescue
operation, not because it was ashamed or thought the action contrary to law
or moral values, but because it realized that its own nationals in Tehran would
be placed at risk if radical forces aligned with the Ayatollah Khomeini learned
of its complicity in the rescue operation.
One almost gets the impression that the authors of Regulating Covert
Action briefly forgot the broad scope of the doctrine addressed by their title
when they wrote in the introduction: "We were anxious to undertake this
assignment not because we like the idea of covert action - we do
not .... "" Opposing all "covert action" is akin to being against all
"secrecy," even when it is used to thwart criminal activity or to support
fundamental humanitarian values. Yet, even if one were to apply the narrow
definition used in the book's subtitle, "covert coercion abroad," Reisman and
Baker clearly do not, in fact, oppose all of its manifestations.17 They
nevertheless do understand that acting covertly carries a price, and they
provide a very valuable service by identifying the ,inherent "down sides" of
bypassing normal democratic decisionmaking processes."i
During the time I was charged with overseeing and passing judgment on
the legality of U. S. covert operations, my strong sense was that most U.S.
"special activities" would have readily received the overwhelming support of
the American people had they been disclosed. Even at the height of the
relatively more active reign of Director of Central Intelligence William Casey
- a time when I was regularly briefed on all U.S. "special activities" - the
large majority of these operations were, in my judgment, noncontroversial and
clearly designed to further values that both international law and the American
people cherish.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL RULES oF THE GAME
Reisman and Baker provide a useful discussion of the coercive use of
military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological tools. They conclude, for
example, that covert bribery of foreign officials by a State is probably
legal,19 but that counterfeiting another State's currency and circulating bogus
bills on the international market would likely be unlawful.20
16. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 1.
17. See, e.g., id. at 6, 77, 140.
18. See, e.g., id. at 14-15, 137.
19. Id. at 29.
20. Id. at 30. While on detail to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon during the Vietnam conflict, I recall
being on the periphery of a psychological warfare campaign in which the United States printed a replicated
North Vietnamese "5 Dong" note on one part of a leaflet beside a note in Vietnamese suggesting that
continued intervention in South Vietnam would harm Hanoi's economy (or perhaps devalue its currency
- my recollection is imprecise). Presumably, the propaganda text could have been cut from the leaflet,
leaving essentially a counterfeit bank note in the hands of its finder. At any rate, the leaflet was never
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A. The "Peace vs. Justice" Debate and the U.N. Charter
The book also includes an excellent historical summary of the struggle to
reconcile the original U.N. Charter's emphasis on peace and stability with the
preference of the Leninist camp and many Third World States for rules
permitting external armed intervention to aid "wars of national liberation" or
"anti-colonial" and "anti-apartheid" struggles." The authors term this later
phenomenon "an interesting but potentially mischievous doctrine of neo-just
war and intervention."' They note that the doctrine has found support in a
variety of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and treaties from
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions' to the 1979 Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages.24 The authors conclude that "[i]t is unclear whether
this standard will become international law or will remain stillborn, like much
of the General Assembly's legislative program in the 1970s, having been
rejected by indispensable actors in the international prescriptive process."'
That question cannot yet be answered with any confidence, and the
related trends are somewhat contradictory. On one hand, the Soviets
renounced the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" used to justify intervention in
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and (arguably) Afghanistan,26 and the primary
targets of "anti-colonial" and "anti-apartheid" struggles have ceased to exist.
Ignoring for a moment the fact that one might quarrel with the authors'
characterization of the so-called "Reagan Doctrine" as having a "parallel
structure" to the Brezhnev Doctrine,27 that policy, too, appears to have been
abandoned. Thus, most of the claimed "exceptions" to the prohibition against
the use of nondefensive armed force may no longer be very relevant and
reestablishing a general consensus around the original San Francisco formula
may well be possible. On the other hand, as will be discussed," the July
1994 decision by the U.N. Security Council authorizing military intervention
in Haiti to restore a democratically elected government that had been deposed
by an internal, unelected authoritarian regime may signal the birth of a new
exception to the Charter's general prohibitions against nondefensive uses of
military coercion and non-intervention in the "internal affairs" of sovereign
used, reportedly because a lawyer in the review process had concluded that it might violate international
law. In contrast, Iran has reportedly circulated nearly perfect counterfeit U.S. one hundred dollar bills for
several years as part of a campaign both to raise funds for terrorist activities and to undermine the U.S.
economy. See, e.g., Bill McAllister, Overseas Counterfeiters Pose Threat to U.S. Currency, WASH. POST,
Apr. 8, 1994, at A19 (quoting terrorism expert Robert Kupperman as saying that groups of terrorists
backed by Iranian and Syrian intelligence agencies were "believed to have produced $1 billion worth of
the most nearly perfect $100 bills that the Secret Service has ever detected"); Nick Rufford & James
Adams, Iran Linked to Flood of Fake Dollars, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July 17, 1994, at 18.
21. RE S MAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 21, 26-27, 38-43, 89.
22. Id. at 27.
23. Id, at 43.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 89.
26. For a general discussion of this issue, see JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE (1987).
27. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 44, 86. For a different perspective on the "Reagan
Doctrine," see Robert F. Turner, International Law, the Reagan Doctrine, and World Peace: Going Back
to the Future, WASH. Q., Autumn 1988, at 119.
28. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
1995] Coercive Covert Action and the Law 433
States.
B. Self-Defense and Countermeasures
Contrary to this more expansive role for nondefensive interventions, the
authors note that "a line of decisions, culminating in Nicaragua, has sought
to narrow the operation of this right [of self-defense] even further by creating
a new and higher legal threshold, by redefining the technical term armed
attack and using it as the prerequisite for unilateral resort to self-defense."3
One can only hope this trend will be reversed, as it is contrary both to the
clear travaux pr$paratoires of the Charter and to the cause of international
peace.
Indeed, this is an area where the authors may warrant criticism. While,
pursuant to the New Haven approach, they dismiss strict textualism as a
jurisprudential tool, the authors nevertheless assert: "If one adopts a strict
textual interpretation of international law, one need look no further than the
United Nations Charter for the answer to these questions. Article 2(4)
proscribes the use of force except in self-defense and 'armed attack' is the
threshold for self-defense."'" A thorough discussion of this issue is beyond
the scope of this review, but a few observations are in order. When the
Charter was written, States had a right to use necessary and proportional
armed force in defense against any act of unprivileged external armed
intervention. 2 As Professor (and later World Court Judge) Philip C. Jessup
argued, "the right of self-defense by its very nature must escape legal
regulation."'" That, clearly, was the position of the U. S. government 4 and
of highly distinguished legal scholars.3"
The issue, then, is whether the Charter limited or otherwise modified the
customary law of self-defense. Article 2(4) of the Charter provides the basic
textual prohibition against the use of force in international law:
29. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
30. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 89.
31. Id. at 73.
32. Until the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty, even aggressive acts of force were not clearly prohibited.
That treaty, moreover, did not limit the use of force in, self-defense, a position emphasized by the United
States and several other delegations and widely recognized by legal scholars. On June 28, 1928, for
example, the United States sent diplomatic notes to the principal foreign offices of the world affirming
that:
[The United States] believes that the right of self-defense is inherent in every sovereign State
and implicit in every treaty. No specific reference to that inalienable attribute of sovereignty
is therefore necessary or desirable. It is no less evident than resort to war in violation of the
proposed treaty by one of the parties thereto would release the other parties from their
obligations under the treaty towards the belligerent State.
1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 91 (1928). See also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 407 (6th ed. 1963); 1
CHARLES FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 278 (4th ed. 1965).
33. PrnUP C. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 163 (1952).
34. During the Kellogg-Briand Treaty negotiations, the United States argued, for example, that
"[e]very nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack
or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in
self-defense." I U.S. FOREIGN REL. 36 (1928).
35. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 269 (1957).
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All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
Article I of the Charter sets forth the "Purposes" of the United Nations, none
of which suggests a desire to prevent nations from defending themselves -
or other victim States - from armed international aggression. Nor does the
reference to "territorial integrity or political independence" reasonably
preclude the defensive use of necessary and proportional force in response to
a prior wrongful use of armed force by another State.
Those who read the right of self-defense narrowly tend, therefore, to rely
upon the expression "armed attack" found in Article 51 of the Charter, which
provides that "[niothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security." Thus - apparently
in accord with the views of Reisman and Baker - Professor Louis Henkin,
of Columbia Law School, argues:
The fair reading of Article 51 permits unilateral use of force only in a very narrow and
clear circumstance, in self-defense if an armed attack occurs. Nothing in the history of the
drafting (the travaux prdparatoires) suggests that the framers of the Charter intended
something broader than the language implies.?'
Many knowledgeable scholars disagree with this view that Article 51
narrowed the right of self-defense. To the extent the meaning of the Charter
text is ambiguous, recourse may be had to the travaux pr~paratoires, as
provided by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 7
Professor J. L. Brierly, in The Law of Nations, summarizes the preparatory
works from the San Francisco Conference, discusses differences in the
Charter's text among the five languages in which it was originally drafted,"8
and determines "that the opening words 'nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' show a clear
intention not to impair the 'inherent', i.e., the existing, natural right of states
to use force in self-defene ....
Professor Brierly notes, for example, that the Russian text refers to the
"imprescriptible" right of self-defense,' a concept embraced by the United
States at the time of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty,4 1 and that the French text is
translated not as "armed attack" but as "armed aggression" - arguably a
broader term. He also notes the unconditional nature of the French text, which
suggests that the use of "if" in the English translation was intended to express
a hypothesis, not a condition.4" Other highly respected international legal
36. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141 (2d ed. 1979).
37. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERLALS 679 (1969).
38. U.N. CHARTER, art. 111.
39. BRIERLY, supra note 32, at 417.
40. Id. at 418.
41. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42. BRIERLY, supra note 32, at 419.
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scholars have taken a similar position,43 as did the U.S. Government both
before and after the Charter was written. 44
III. -NICARAGUAN COVERT ACTION AND THE
PARAMiTARY AcrivmEs CASE
Indeed, the recent publication 'of ICJ Judge'Stephen Schwebel's Justice
in International Law,4" which includes lectures and articles dating well over
a decade before the Paramilitary Activities (or Nicaragua) case came before
the Court, refutes any suggestion that his brilliant dissent was influenced by
allegiance to his native United States. Rather, his position was consistent with
his previous understanding of the Charter's prohibition of low-intensity
aggression and the right to use force in collective self-defense in response to
such acts.' It is worth noting that Nicaragua's memorials in the case argued
a theory of international law that was quite similar to the position embraced
by the United States. According to the parties, the crux of the matter was
largely thefactual issue of which side struck first. Nicaragua and the United
States accused each other of essentially identical behavior, such as, covertly
providing funds, weapons, ammunition, other equipment, training,
intelligence, communications, and strategic guidance to guerrillas operating
in El Salvador and Nicaragua.47 Nicaragua, however, swore to the Court that
it had given no assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front ("FMLN"). 48 In contrast, the United States did not
deny its support for the Nicaraguan Contras, arguing instead that it was acting
in collective self-defense of El Salvador, which had requested U.S. assistance
and was under a serious and sustained attack by the Sandinista-backed
FMLN. 49
In reality, as Judge Schwebel's dissent demonstrated, the evidence that
Nicaragua intervened in El Salvador (and other countries) to overthrow the
lawful government of that country was overwhelming." Indeed, throughout
its early history, the Sandinista Front was avowedly Marxist-Leninist and
43. See, e.g., D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (1958); ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POIUTICAL ORGANS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 200-01, 204 (1963).
44. For examples of early United States, United Nations, and Organization of American States
support for the position that armed force could be used in response to indirect aggression, see Robert F.
Turner, Peace and the World Court: A Comment on the Paramilitary Activities Case, 20 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 53, 56-69 (1987) [hereinafter Turner, Peace and the World Court].
45. STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994).
46. See, e.g., id. at 530-92.
47. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 61 (June 27); see also infra
note 53 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Sworn Affidavit of Miguel D'Escoto Broclknann, Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, dated
April 21, 1984, submitted to the International Court of Justice: "In truth, my government is not engaged,
and has not been engaged, in the provision of arms or other supplies to either of the factions engaged in
the civil war in El Salvador."
49. On the question of whether El Salvador actually requested U.S. assistance, see infra note 63.
50. My own writings at the time of the case illustrated the same point. See, e.g., TURNER, supra
note 10. Judge Schwebel's dissent cited this study, which resulted from work as a consultant to the office
of the Department of State Legal Adviser, in manuscript form.
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openly embraced an "internationalist duty" of assisting neighboring "national
liberation" movements.5"
The classified evidence was even stronger. Even the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence - a group chaired by Representative
Edward Boland (author of the various "Boland Amendments") that was
consistently critical of U.S. support for the Contras - admitted that the
classified evidence it had seen established "with certainty" that
A major portion of the arms and other material sent by Cuba and other communist countries
to the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with the permission and assistance of the
Sandinistas.
The Salvadoran insurgents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua, some of which are located
in Managua itself, for communications, command-and-control, and for the logistics to
conduct their financial, material, and propaganda activities.
The Sandinista leadership sanctions and directly facilitates all of the above functions. 2
During this same time period, reporters from the New York Times,5"
Washington Post,54 and Los Angeles Times55 quoted various Salvadoran
guerrilla leaders as acknowledging that the Sandinistas were supplying them
with arms and other assistance; indeed, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega
has indirectly admitted providing such aid.56 The ICJ, nevertheless, in a
highly political decision, elected to ignore the evidence.
Particularly harmful was the Court's holding that acts of armed
aggression falling below an 'armed attack" threshold could be countered only
by the individual efforts of the victim State, without a right to the "collective"
assistance of neighbors or treaty partners.57 The Court reasoned:
The acts of which Nicaragua is accused.. . could only have justified proportionate
counter-measures on the part of the State which had been the victim of these acts, namely
El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica. They could not justify counter-measures taken by a
third State, the United States, and particularly could not justify intervention involving the
use of force.58
The likely impact of this holding was astounding, given that peaceful
Costa Rica, with a population like Nicaragua's of roughly three million, had
no army at all and only a small "civil guard" of about 8,000 lightly-armed
men. In contrast, by the end of 1985, Nicaragua had built up a modern army
51. See, e.g., id at 43-45.
52. U.S. CONGRESS, HousE, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, AMENDMENT TO
THE INTELLIGENCE AuTHORIzATION ACT FOR FIscAL YEAR 1983, H.R. REP. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1983). For other statements of a similar nature by this committee and other groups who had
access to classified intelligence information, see TURNER, supra note 10, at 82-86.
53. See, e.g., Alan Riding, Salvador Rebels: Five Sided Alliance Searching for New, Moderate
Image, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1982, at Al.
54. See, e.g., Christopher Dickey, Lefts Guerrillas in El Salvador Defend Cuba ies, WASH. POST,
Mar. 11, 1983, at Al.
55. See, e.g., David Wood, Salvadoran ies to Cuba Cited: Rebels Brag of Cuban ies, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1983, at Al.
56. See TURNER, supra note 10, at 91.
57. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.CJ. at 110.
58. Id. at 127.
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numbering about 64,000, had announced plans to more than triple that
strength,59 and was equipped with an array of Soviet artillery, armor, and
air power (including the most modern Hind-D helicopters) that was
unprecedented and unmatched in the region.'
Until the Court's ruling, Costa Rica had every reason to assume the
wisdom of its decision to invest in public education, social welfare programs,
and similar democratic priorities, rather than an army - which its constitution
in fact prohibited - was sound. After all, if a military threat to its security
were to arise, it could rely upon the United States and other OAS allies to
come to its assistance. By taking the view that victims of externally supported,
low-intensity armed aggression could rely upon only their own resources for
defense, even though such intervention might ultimately bring about a change
of government and deny the people their right to self-determination just as
thoroughly as a massive direct invasion, the Court both encouraged armed
international aggression and discouraged States like Costa Rica from forsaking
a large military establishment in favor of meeting the human needs of its
citizens. Ultimately, perhaps the greatest need of States and their citizens is
national security; thus, when it undermined the right of collective self-defense,
the Court greatly increased the likelihood of regional arms races.
Regulating Covert Action handles Paramilitary Activities well, though the
discussion of the case is brief. The authors not only reject the Court's
extremely narrow interpretation of the right of self-defense, 6' but further
question the legality of the Court's decision to ignore both U.S. and
Salvadoran claims that El Salvador had requested U.S. assistance in collective
self-defense prior to the filing of the case.62 The Court's action on this issue
was all the more outrageous because only the United States and El Salvador
would have had knowledge of the existence (or lack) of such a request.63
The Paramilitary Activities Case was clearly an anomaly. Opinions
of the ICJ have no precedential authority as stare decisis, 4 and it is now
embarrassingly clear that the Court was simply deceived - perhaps too easily
in some cases - by the covert nature of Nicaragua's efforts to overthrow
59. See, e.g., Turner, Peace and the World Court, supra note 44, at 70-71 nn.59-61 and sources
cited therein.
60. See TURNER, supra note 10, at 15-16.
61. REIsMAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 98.
62. For the record, I discussed this issue personally with Salvadoran President Alvaro Magafta Borja
while visiting El Salvador as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in early 1984 and was assured that such
a request had, in fact, been made. I had accompanied a delegation of presidential election observers to El
Salvador in connection with the 1984 presidential elections and (along with Professor John Norton Moore,
a member of the U.S. presidential delegation) spoke with President Magafia on this issue at that time.
63. Reisman and Baker write:
The presumption that the United States was not engaged in collective self-defense at the
request of El Salvador, which the court rendered jurs et de jure by not permitting El
Salvador even to argue for its right to intervene, was outcome-determinative and of dubious
lawfulness. Indeed, in subsequent phases of the case, judges who had voted against El
Salvador on this point expressed their regret.
REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 98.
64. "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect to that
particular case." I.C.J. STAT., art. 59.
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neighboring governments. While a decade ago the covert nature of Nicaraguan
involvement in El Salvador may have been less evident, an explosion in
Managua two years ago led to a series of discoveries that revealed Sandinista
support of guerrillas in neighboring States. The Washington Post reported
that:
explosions that ripped through a car repair shop on the outskirts of Managua at dawn May
23 [1993] sent shock waves far beyond Nicaragua. From the debris have emerged a
guerrilla arsenal threatening the Salvadoran peace process, documents detailing a Marxist
kidnapping ring directed against Latin American millionaires, and hundreds of false
passports and identity papers.
The three blasts... killed two people, damaged 16 houses and exposed a
sophisticated bunker beneath the shop containing tons of weapons, including 19
surface-to-air missiles....
Few familiar with the case believe such an operation could have been set up without
at least the Sandinista Front acting as a willing host. Following the triumph of their
revolution in 1979, the Sandinistas developed, with the help of Soviet Bloc and Cuban
advisers, the most sophisticated intelligence operation in Central America. The Sandinista
Front also hosted groups from the PLO, Italian Red Brigades, ErA and Libya.6'
In the weeks following the explosion, FMLN leader Shafik Jorge Handal
(who also served as Secretary General of the Communist Party of El
Salvador) admitted to an outraged U.N. Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali that the weapons found in the debris - and tons of other
weapons hidden in nearly a dozen other secret locations near Managua -
belonged to his organization. An account in the Washington Post of the
Secretary General's angry letter, in which he denounced what he termed the
FMLN's "deliberate attempt to mislead me," concluded by observing: "For
most of the 1980s, the FMLN received substantial arms support from
Nicaragua's Marxist-oriented Sandinista government, and the weapons caches
are believed to date from that period. That cooperation reportedly lessened
after the Sandinistas lost power in Nicaragua's 1990 elections."66
Alluding to the reams of documents found by the Chamorro government
following the May explosion, the Los Angeles Times reported:
[Tihe stash revealed a vast kidnapping and weapons-smuggling network run by Latin
revolutionaries for much of the last decade....
The discovery revived memories of the Sandinistas' recent past, when, as rulers of
Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990, they converted the country into a haven for radical leftists
from around the world....
Throughout the 1980s, the Sandinistas ... welcomed and gave refuge to terrorists,
65. Douglas Farah, Managua Blasts Rip Lid O4 Secrets, WASH. POST, July 14, 1993, at Al. Any
serious doubts about the Sandinista's connection with the arms depot should have been abated when it was
learned that "serial numbers were removed from 16 of the 19 surface-to-air missiles immediately after the
blasts to make it impossible to trace their origins. Sources said the missiles, which were picked up by the
[Sandinista-controlled] army, were black with soot and ash except for shiny spots where the serial number
should have been." Id. Shortly thereafter, President Violeta Chamorro called for the resignation of
Sandinista General Humberto Ortego as chief of the armed forces. Humberto Ortega, brother of former
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, served as Defense Minister during the 1980s, when the Sandinistas
were in power. See Ortega to Step Down, THE TAMPA TRIBuNE, Dec. 22, 1994, at 6.
66. John M. Goshko, Salvadorans Accused of Hiding Arms; Guerrilla Cache Said to Be in
Nicaragua, WASH. PosT, June 17, 1993, at A37. See also Arsenal Mars New Image of Salvador's
Ex-Rebels, N.Y. Tam, June 26, 1983, at A8.
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Communists and assorted radicals from Latin America, the Mideast and Europe.6
In September, another "huge cache of arms" belonging to "Guatemalan
guerrillas" was found in Nicaragua," lending support to the New York Times
observation that "the Sandinistas provided extensive support for leftist rebel
groups," during their reign in Nicaragua in the 1980s.69
In essence, the Paramilitary Activities case was a dispute over facts. The
United States claimed that Nicaragua was providing a broad range of
assistance, including large quantities of arms and ammunition, to the FMLN
for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of El Salvador. American
mirror-image covert assistance to guerrillas in Nicaragua was designed to
discourage Managua's unlawful interference in neighboring States and was
thus justifiable collective self-defense in response to El Salvador's request.
Nicaragua, on the other hand, denied giving such aid to the FMLN. Whatever
confusion might have existed a decade ago on this issue, the facts are now
clear. The Sandinistas deceived most of the judges on the World Court and
a lot of other people as well. Paramilitary Activities was an unfortunate
aberration of little value - except, perhaps, as evidence of Nicaragua's
successful use of covert action to deceive the international community.7"
IV. A NEw DEMOCRACY NoRM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The development of international law is an evolutionary process, and one
of the most interesting questions being raised in the post-Cold War era
concerns the preferred status of democracy as a form of government. For the
United States, the principle is an ancient one: Thomas Jefferson, as our first
Secretary of State, argued that the new Nation ought to "acknowledge any
government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation
substantially declared."71 Writing to John Adams less than five years before
their coincidental deaths on July 4, 1826, Jefferson envisioned a bright future
for their mutual experiment in government and thus asserted that "the flames
67. Tracy Wilkinson, Stalking the Rich for Ransom: An Illegal Arms Depot Blast in Nicaragua
Reveals a Far-Reaching Network of Terror - A Ring of Leftist Rebels Who Kidnapped Latin America's
Wealthy, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at Al.
68. Tim Golden, NewArms Scandal Adds to Nicaragua's Woes, N.Y. TI A, Sept. 5, 1993, at A20.
69. Id.
70. Since these words were written, the latest version of Professor Shabtai Rosenne's classic work,
The World Court: What It Is and How It Works, has been published. It includes a postscript discussing the
May 23, 1993 car repair shop explosion and the events that followed, concluding that they "cannot be
reconciled with statements made in Court on behalf of Nicaragua." Professor Rosenne, widely regarded
as the world's foremost authority on the Court, concludes:
To a very large extent these revalations [sic] brought to light a situation closely resembling
that which had been described by the State Department [prior to the Court's decision] ....
and confirmed facts elucidated by Judge Schwebel in his questioning from the Bench.
This is not the first time that an international tribunal has been misled by one of the parties
in its appreciation of the facts. It remains to be seen how far these later revelations, following
on an accidental explosion in Managua, will affect the different assessments that have been
made of this case and its value as a precedent, especially where the unwilling respondent
withdrew from further participation in the proceedings before the merits were reached.
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WoRLD COURT: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WoRKS 152-53 (5th ed. 1995).
71. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Nov. 7, 1792), in 6 THE WRrn us oF
THoMAS JEFFERSON, 1792-1794, at 131 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895).
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kindled on the 4th. of July, 1776. have spread over too much of the globe to
be extinguished by the feeble engines of despotism. On the contrary they will
consume those engines, and all who work them."'
Sadly, that dream did not quickly become a reality. Throughout most of
our history, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have greatly outnumbered
those espousing democracy as a preferred theory of government. The early
1980s, however, witnessed a dramatic growth of democracy in Latin
America.' The subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire produced a virtual
explosion of States embracing the idea that the "will of the people" is the only
legitimate basis of goveriment.74 By 1992, Professor Thomas M. Franck,
Editor in Chief of the American Journal of International Law, speculated that
"democracy... is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that
increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international
processes." 75
Professor Reisman has been at the forefront of the struggle for such a
right to democracy,76 and Regulating Covert Action adds intellectual strength
to the cause. The authors write:
Genuine self-determination is... in our view, the basic postulate of political legitimacy of
this century....
Though all interventions are lamentable, the fact is that some may serve, in terms of
aggregate consequences, to increase the probability of the free choice of peoples about their
government and political structure. In some instances, it may be the only possibility. Other
interventions have the manifest objective and consequence of doing exactly the opposite.
There is, thus, neither need nor justification for treating in a mechanically equal fashion,
United States covert operations in postwar Greece or Italy, which sought to enable the
exercise of self-determination, on the one hand, and Soviet covert intervention in Poland or
Cuban operations in Central America, which undermine popular movements and impose
undesired regimes on coerced populations, on the other.... It is like equating a mugger's
knifing of a citizen on the street with a surgeon's removal of a tumor from that ailing
citizen, because both actions involve one human being's putting a knife into another. The
strikingly different appraisals of these various cases by the international legal system should
occasion no surprise.'
Since Regulating Covert Action was written, several developments have
occurred that suggest the lawfulness of external intervention to restore a
democratically elected regime when it has been replaced by tyranny, at least
in some circumstances. In Latin America the acceptance of such intervention
seems particularly strong, a fact that may seem surprising, given Latin
72. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Sept. 12, 1821), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERsON
L=Rs, 1812-1826, at 575 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
73. In 1979, perhaps a third of the people of Latin America lived under governments that were
arguably democratic. By 1986, that figure exceeded 90 percent. See TURNER, supra note 10, at 1.
74. See, e.g., Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension
of the CSCE, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1306 (1990), through which 35 States in 1990
(including the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and many other formerly totalitarian
regimes) embraced the doctrine that "democracy is an inherent element of the rule of law" and committed
themselves to a range of specific safeguards designed to make that rule a reality. Id. at 1308.
75. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46,
46 (1992).
76. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article
2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984).
77. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 74-75.
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America's long history of regional resentment of unilateral U.S. intervention
under various corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine. Yet, the principle that
"representative democracy" is the only legitimate form of government finds
expression in the 1948 Charter of the Organization of American States
(OAS). 78
This historic commitment to representative democracy has been
reaffirmed many times by the OAS. For example, on June 5, 1991, OAS
members unanimously approved General Assembly Resolution 1080, which
instructed the OAS Secretary General:
to call for the immediate convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council in the case of
any event giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political
institutional process of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected
government in any of the Organization's member States, in order, within the framework of
the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on and convene an ad hoc meeting of the
ministers of foreign affairs, or a special session of the General Assembly, all of which must
take place within a ten-day period."
Writing in a Council on Foreign Relations study last year, former OAS
Principal Legal Adviser Domingo Acevedo argued that OAS members no
longer consider the illegal overthrow of a democratically elected government
to be "a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of its member
States, and thus immune from international scrutiny." He added that the
OAS's handling of "the coup in Suriname in December 1990, the attempted
coup in Venezuela in February 1992, and the so-called autogolpe by the
constitutional president of Peru in April 1992 and of Guatemala in May
1993," demonstrates this change in perspective."0
U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 may arguably contain additional
support for the view that military intervention is permissible to eject a military
government and restore a democratically elected regime to power. Although
the Security Council justified intervention in Haiti on the grounds that "the
situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the
region," it is difficult to identify any "threat to peace and security" posed by
the C6dras regime at least as those terms have traditionally been understood.
Certainly Haiti had not used military force, or threatened to use such force,
against any other State. The underlying motive behind the Security Council's
action appears to have been the desire to restore "democracy" in Haiti. If that
objective is legal, then a more favorable legal assessment of the 1989 U.S.
intervention in Panama (Operation Just Cause) may ultimately be
warranted. 1
78. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, art. 5(d).
79. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, GENERAL ASsEMBLY RESOLUTION 1080 (June 5, 1991),
reprinted in NATIONAL SECURTY LAW DOcuMENTs, at 561 (Moore et al. eds., 1995).
80. Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in
Protecting Democracy, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTs
119, 141 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1994). See also FRANcIsco VILLAGRAN DE LEON, THE OAS AND
DEMOCRATIC DEELOPMENT (U.S. Institute of Peace, 1992).
81. Though I am a great proponent of democracy, I am not a fan of deception in such matters.
Presumably, the veto power protects the United States from Security Council abuse. I am nevertheless
troubled by the "threat to peace and security" rationale relied upon to justify intervention in Haiti, an
action that under the language of the Charter would otherwise appear to be barred by the prohibition
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V. DEMOCRACY, DEMOCIDE, AND PEACE
The publication last year of Professor Rudy Rummel's new book, Death
By Government, which examines the problem of "Democide" - the killing
of people by their own governments - has enormous importance in making
the case for a democracy norm. Rummel's research, backed by hundreds of
pages of tabulated data, suggests that fifteen regimes alone have killed nearly
four times more people than have died in all of the wars of this century.82
Lest the reader .conclude that Professor Rummel simply exaggerated the
human costs of specific totalitarian regimes, it is noteworthy that a 1994
report by the Washington Post provided an aggregate figure for the "unnatural
deaths" under Mao, Stalin, and Hitler ranging from 112 to 162 million," a
figure substantially higher than Rummel's estimate of 101 million for the same
regimes."
Even if Professor Rummel's estimates are significantly off, the
importance of his research in validating the promotion of democratic
governance would not be greatly diminished. When one adds the research
being done by scholars such as Professor Bruce Russett of Yale University
and Professor John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia on the
importance of democracy in avoiding international wars, the case for a
democracy norm in international law becomes all the more powerful. Using
covert action as a means of promoting democracy may seem incongruous at
first glance, and permitting individual States to use such an option entails
some obvious risks. At the same time, however, the option lends sufficient
advantages over the overt military option that it ought not be entirely or
automatically ruled out."8
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
U.S. covert action is regulated as much by domestic rules as by
international law, and some of the most interesting and important related legal
issues involve the separation of national security powers under the
Constitution. Perhaps understandably, if lamentably, the authors essentially
"ducked" this critically important question by arguing that "[a] Hamilton may
be matched against a Madison,"" and concluding that the constitutional
against intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...."
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7. If the Security Council has concluded that customary international law now
permits international intervention in support of democratic governance, it should say so openly.
82. R. J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 3 (1994). A supplementary volume, Statistics of
Democide, should be available from the University of Virginia Center for National Security Law by the
time this Review is published.
83. Valerie Strauss and Daniel Southerland, How Many Died?, WASH. PosT, July 17, 1994, at A22.
84. RUMMEL, supra note 82, at 8.
85. See, e.g., REISMAN AND BAKER, supra note 2, at 8. See also note 15 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 117 (quoting Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown). Writing as Helvidlus,
Madison did challenge Hamilton's Pacificus argument that the executive power clause gave the President
general control over foreign relations. As early as 1789, Madison himself had argued, as a member of
Congress, that this clause vested in the President all powers "executive" in their nature - subject only
to the narrowly construed exceptions expressly provided in the Constitution. See 1 ANNALS OF CoNe.
515-17 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). At the time the Constitution was written, every country treated foreign
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arguments "are inconclusive" and "are better engaged elsewhere." 7 Yet they
are unable to resist the temptation to add the conclusion that "what is clear,
and indeed common ground, is that any executive power to conduct covert
action insofar as it exists, absent statutory authority, arises from an implied
constitutional power and not an explicit enumerated power. "88
I strongly disagree with the authors on this point. While a detailed
discussion of the President's constitutional authority over such matters is
beyond the scope of this review, the reader should be aware that a serious
case can be made that the "executive power" vested in the President by
Article II of the Constitution includes a general grant of authority to control
the nation's external intercourse, subject only to constitutional limitations,
such as those "exceptions" clearly enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution,
including the power of the Senate to veto a completed treaty 9 and the power
of either the House of Representatives or the Senate to veto the decision to
launch an aggressive "war."9
Reisman and Baker do acknowledge that, "[a]s a matter of practice, at
least since President Jefferson, the executive has conducted covert action
without specific congressional authorization.""' They might usefully have,
included evidence from the considerable body of constitutional history,
however, which ranges from John Jay's comment in Federalist No. 64 that the
Constitution left the President "able to manage the business of intelligence in
such manner as prudence may suggest,"92 to the early practice of
appropriating funds for foreign affairs in gross - leaving their use to
executive discretion and allowing the President to account merely for the
amount of money spent for purposes considered too sensitive to disclose to
Congress.93 President Jefferson summarized this early practice in an 1804
letter to Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin: "The Constitution has made the
Executive the organ for managing our intercourse with foreign nations ...
The Executive being thus charged with the foreign intercourse, no law has
undertaken to prescribe its specific duties.... "9" More specifically,
President Jefferson also remarked that: "[I]t has been the uniform opinion and
practice that the whole foreign fund was placed by the Legislature on the
affairs as an "executive" function - as did such influential publicists and writers as Vattel, Locke,
Montesquieu, and Blackstone. For excerpts from Madison's 1789 statement and other relevant early
documents on the issue, see Robert F. Turner, The Constitutional Frameworkfor the Division of National
Security Powers between Congress, the President, and the Couns, in JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL.,
NATIONAL SEcUrrY LAW 749, 758-59 (1990).
87. Id. at 118.
88. Id.
89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
90. Id. art. I, § 8. For discussions of the scope of the "declare war" clause and the meaning of the
"executive power" clause, see Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause, supra note 1, at
906-10, 929-49.
91. REisMAN AND BAKER, supra note 2, at 118.
92. FEDERAIST No. 64, supra note 12, at 435.
93. "[Ihe President shall account specifically for all such expenditures of the said money as in his
judgment may be made public, and also for the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable
not to specify, and cause a regular statement and account thereof to be laid before Congress
annually . 1..." I Stat. 129.
94. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Feb. 19, 1804), reprinted in 11 THE WR1TINms
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 5 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905).
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footing of a contingent fund, in which they undertake no specifications, but
leave the whole to the discretion of the President."95
Jefferson funded paramilitary covert operations against the Barbary
Pirates from this "secret service" account, and when such operations were
later disclosed, Congress raised no question about the propriety of such
behavior or about any need for prior congressional authorization.96 Congress
did not assert a constitutional right to monitor such sensitive operations until
the post Vietnam/Watergate era, and although, in the interest of comity, the
Executive branch has acquiesced in some of the subsequent restrictions
(primarily having to do with reporting requirements), the constitutional basis
for legislative micromanagement of such activities is highly suspect.
Reisman and Baker note that much of the recent constitutional debate has
been characterized by "[s]olemn invocations of Supreme Court decisions such
as Curtiss-Wright or Youngstown," a debate they find "inconclusive.""' To
be sure, it has become popular9" for advocates of greater legislative control
over foreign affairs to argue that the 1936 Curtiss-Wight9 9 approach - by
far the most often cited Supreme Court authority for foreign affairs cases -
has been narrowed or even overturned by Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
in the Youngstown case."oc While the two cases may at first appear to
conflict, they are actually quite easy to reconcile. At the heart of both Justice
Black's majority opinion and the famous Jackson concurrence in Youngstown
is the theme that seizing control of the Nation's steel mills, even during time
of "emergency," was a "domestic" action requiring "due process of law."
This was a quite reasonable interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's mandate
that takings of private property require "due process of law."' 0°
Time and again, Justice Jackson stressed that he was addressing the
President's "internal" and "domestic" actions and that he would have given
the President the widest latitude if his actions had been "external" to the
country. In contrast, the Curtiss-Wright case has for more than fifty years
been the landmark Supreme Court decision on the President's foreign affairs
powers. Indeed, Justice Jackson cited Curtiss-Wright in his Youngstown
concurrence and distinguished it as affecting "a situation in foreign
territory. "1 02 Noting that seizing a steel mill within the United States was
not such a case, he said of Curtiss-Wright: "That case does not solve the
95. Id. at 10.
96. However, some members did complain about reports that the United States had paid only a
portion of the money promised to Hamet as a bribe for his leading a paramilitary force against Tripoli to
pressure his brother, the Bey of Tripoli, to end his predacious attacks against U.S. merchant ships in the
Mediterranean. These members reasoned that he had served the United States well, and that other
individuals might be less willing to cooperate in the future if he were not treated honorably. For a
discussion of this operation, see SOFAER, supra note 9, at 218-21.
97. REISMAN AND BAKER, supra note 2, at 131.
98. See HAROLD HONGIU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURIrY CONsTnIUToN 72 (1990) (popularizing
this view, which was also recently embraced by Professor John Hart Ely). See generally ELY, supra note
9. This view is held by many others as well.
99. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
100. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
101. "No person shall.., be deprived of... property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
102. 343 U.S. at 636 n.2.
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present controversy. It recognized internal and external affairs as being in
separate categories, and held that the strict limitation upon congressional
delegations of power to the President over internal affairs does not apply with
respect to delegations of power in external affairs." 1°3 While no other
member of the Court joined his concurrence, his own analysis clearly shows
that Jackson was not endeavoring to "overturn" or otherwise modify
Curtiss-Wright with respect to presidential power over external affairs.
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist also noted this distinction in Goldwater v.
Carter (the Taiwan treaty case) in a concurring opinion joined by three other
members of the Court:
The present case differs in several important respects from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer. . . cited by petitioners as authority both for reaching the merits of this dispute
and for reversing the Court of Appeals. In Youngstown, private litigants brought a suit
contesting the President's authority under his war powers to seize the Nation's steel
industry, an action of profound and demonstrable domestic impact .... [A]s in
Curtiss-Wright, the effect of this action, as far as we can tell, is "entirely external to the
United States, and [falls] within the category of foreign affairs.""°
In my view, a careful reading of the two important decisions compels such a
distinction. Even Columbia Law School Professor Louis Henkin, in recent
years a powerful advocate of congressional power in foreign affairs, has
acknowledged that Youngstown has not traditionally been viewed as a "foreign
affairs" case. 5 A serious discussion of the separation of constitutional
powers concerning covert action would be useful as the nation continues to
emerge from the backlash to Vietnam, and I therefore regret that these two
brilliant scholars did not include such an analysis in their book.
VII. THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
In their introduction, Reisman and Baker note that "the special research
problems encountered in studying this subject are formidable."" ° This is,
if anything, an understatement. The inherent difficulties in researching
politically or militarily sensitive data make their final product all the more
admirable, but also prevented the authors from discussing some aspects of
regulating covert action in detail. For example, they devote less than two
paragraphs to the role of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board
("PIOB" or "IOB"'°), suggesting that it "may also play a peripheral role
in covert action mechanisms," but noting that "in at least one publicized
instance, ... the IOB's general counsel rendered an opinion on the legality
of an ongoing covert operation."'
103. Id. at 637 n.2.
104. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-05 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
105. HENKIN, supra note 36, at 43.
106. REIsMAN AND BAKER, supra note 2, at 2.
107. The abbreviation "IOB" was widely used during the Carter Administration, but - both to be
consistent with usage for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board ("PFIAB," not "FIAB"),
and, perhaps more importantly, to emphasize the authority of the Board as a component of the White
House Office - the Reagan administration used the abbreviation "PIOB." President Clinton has returned
to the "IOB" designation, dropping "President's" from the Board's title. See infra note 109.
108. REISMAN AND BAKER, supra note 2, at 122.
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Having spent two years at the White House as Counsel to the PIOB in the
early 1980s, I am able to offer a few observations on that organization. °9
Because virtually all of the PIOB's substantive work was highly classified, of
course, I am no more able to address those areas in a public forum than were
the authors of Regulating Covert Action. I can say that, at least during the
years I was there, the PIOB was briefed regularly on ongoing "special
activities," and I am unaware of any such operations subsequently coming to
light that were not disclosed to us in a timely manner."'
A common criticism of-the PIOB is that its small staff cannot possibly do
an effective job. That was not my experience. While the immediate PIOB staff
consisted, at the time, of a single attorney and an administrative staff member,
the President charged scores of lawyers and investigators located throughout
the Executive branch (including the general counsels and inspectors general
of all of the intelligence agencies) with making regular reports to, and
otherwise cooperating with, the PIOB. These individuals were highly
professional and honorable men and women who took their responsibilities
seriously and were fully forthcoming both in responding to inquiries and,
perhaps more importantly, in initiating contacts when potential problems came
to their attention.
While some of these individuals spent much of their time inquiring into
legal issues surrounding intelligence activities - and thus knew the "rules"
well - others addressed only those intelligence matters placed before them.
For these latter individuals in particular, the obligation to submit regular
reports to the PIOB affirming their agency's compliance with relevant laws,
executive orders, and Attorney General-approved guidelines and procedures
had a positive effect. If nothing else, it required them to focus their attention
on the issue of compliance. Similarly, the requirement in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that "States Parties... submit reports
on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights
recognized... and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those
rights""' helps to promote respect for those legal obligations by requiring
each State to focus on its own record of compliance. Even if no one had ever
read the reports, the reporting requirement served a useful purpose simply by
109. The authority for the PIOB during my service in the White House was Exec. Order No. 12,334
(December 4, 1981), which was revoked by President Clinton by Exec. Order No. 12,863 (September 13,
1993). Whereas the Reagan Executive Order established the PIOB as an independent three-member entity
within the White House Office (with.a requirement that the PIOB Chairman also serve on the PFIAB),
President Clinton's order establishes an "Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB)" as "a standing committee
of the PFIAB" consisting of as many as four members appointed by the PFIAB Chairman. Exec. Order
No. 12,863, 3 C.F.R. 632 (1993), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West Supp. 1994).
110. For example, we were informed about "mining of the harbors" in support of the Contra
program in Nicaragua prior to the unfortunate controversy in which senior members of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence alleged that the activity had been concealed from them. Having seen the notes
of a senior committee staff member at the time, I have reason to believe that the Senators were mistaken.
At least one senior committee staff member who attended their covert action briefing wrote down a
reference in his notes to mining harbors. This is not to suggest that the Senators were intentionally
misrepresenting the facts; my assumption has always been that they simply did not focus on the issue when
it was reported and consequently could not recall it when it came under attack in the press.
111. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 181,
art. 40.
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reminding relevant officials of the existing regulatory regime."'
To be sure, occasions arise when a field operative, or even an enthusiastic
senior official, becomes so focused on mission accomplishment that legal rules
and procedures are ignored or bypassed as mere unwarranted impediments.
Given the stakes sometimes involved - which may include the freedom, or
even the lives, of large numbers of people - such a reaction is to be expected
and is one of the reasons the Executive branch intelligence oversight system
exists. In my experience, the ignorance of legal rules was not a problem
within the oversight community. The IGs-andtheir staffs understood their role
as "junk yard dogs" in pursuing possible violators and enforcing compliance,
and in my view, the system worked quite well. ,
Further, senior intelligence officials often welcomed the existence of the
PIOB, perhaps in part because it gave them a measure of "good faith"
protection. If they wished to conduct an operation that was even arguably
illegal or improper, they could report the activity to the Board and establish
that they were not trying to "cover up" anything. And, to some extent, they
also could "pass the buck" to a higher level if a controversy eventually arose
over the activity. After all, if they could demonstrate that they had reported
a questionable activity to the PIOB and that the PIOB neglected to bring the
problem to the President's attention, the "buck" would presumably stop with
the PIOB.
One criticism leveled at the PIOB was that it lacked the subpoena power.
To be sure, no such power existed - nor, it should be added, was such a
power at all necessary. On the contrary, I learned very early that when you
work directly for the President of the United States, you simply don't need a
subpoena power to get cooperation from within the Executive branch. 1 3
Finally, a brief comment may be in order concerning the widely-criticized
"legal opinion" which one of my successors as PIOB Counsel reportedly gave
to Lt. Col. Oliver North, examining the applicability of the Boland
112. Indeed, on one occasion that I recall, a newly appointed government official (whose intelligence
responsibilities were peripheral to his primary duties) informed me that he first became aware of the
detailed regulatory scheme when his staff brought him a draft PIOB report.
113. Ironically, this was an issue raised by Reisman and Baker, who write of the two White House
intelligence boards: "Their influence appears to be limited. Although the heads of departments and
agencies are required to provide the boards with all 'necessary' information, they need do so only 'to the
extent permitted by law.'" REISMAN AND BAKER supra note 2, at 123. The footnote to this statement cites
section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which provides that "the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." Id. at 190-91, n.54. Early during my service as PIOB counsel, someone suggested that it
might be necessary for an agency to withhold from the PIOB information about exceptionally sensitive
activities. Disclosing any intelligence operation to the PIOB could not, however, even arguably be an
"unauthorized disclosure" because disclosure is expressly directed by Exec. Order No. 12,334.
The instances over a two-year' period in which I perceived a lack of full cooperation by senior
Intelligence Community personnel could be enumerated on one hand (with fingers left over). On one
occasion, an informal telephone call to a Pentagon service secretary within minutes produced a very
apologetic general, hat in hand, who had apparently not understood his appropriate relationship with the
civilians appointed by the Commander in Chief to oversee his activities. Another time, a disagreement with
an agency head was promptly resolved by simply informing him that, if he found the PIOB's legal
interpretation of its authority to be unacceptable, the PIOB would go directly to the President for a
clarification of the issue. In both instances, not only was the immediate problem resolved in favor of full
and effective oversight, but future relations with the individuals and organizations involved were
impeccable. From my perspective, the system worked well.
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Amendment to the National Security Council. I have never seen the memo in
question, and it would be inappropriate (not to mention difficult) for me to
pass judgment on the substantive merits of the document. Perhaps the opinion
was flawed, as many critics contend. But criticizing the PIOB Counsel for
giving an "advisory opinion," in response to an inquiry about whether a
specific matter otherwise within his jurisdiction would be contrary to the law,
in my opinion, is not warranted.
A primary purpose of intelligence oversight is to promote full compliance
with the laws and governing rules and regulations. Although it was not
common, on more than one occasion while serving as PIOB Counsel, I was
contacted by someone within the Intelligence Community who sought advice
about whether a proposed new administrative rule or other matter would likely
be acceptable to the PIOB. -I did not hesitate to respond, and, in at least one
such case, an agency subsequently issued a revised and more restrictive rule
as a consequence of relatively mild concerns I had expressed during such a
call. This experience reflected a general trend within the Intelligence
Community of wanting to keep the PIOB happy. While, as a result of the
"case or controversy" clause.. 4 of our Constitution, the Supreme Court may
not issue "advisory opinions," it does not follow that the PIOB should repel
inquiries for informal guidance. On the contrary, people within the
Intelligence Community ought to be encouraged to seek guidance whenever
they believe that their actions might run afoul of the rules.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Reisman and Baker conclude their valuable study by reaffirming some of
the obvious (and less than obvious 15) "costs" associated with acting
covertly. They nonetheless predict that such operations will continue and that
decisionmakers will judge the legality of covert operations "not simply by
reference to the property of secrecy,... but by reference to the many
different policies engaged in the particular case, the options available, the
aggregate consequences likely to attend each of the options, and so on."16
They suggest:
Key parts of the focus of covert operations may change. It is apparent that external threats
to national public order are increasingly being redefined in terms of a number of
nongovernmental operations: terrorism, broadly and often inconsistently defined; organized
crime and narcotics; and, to a lesser degree, transnational white-collar crime. The
apprehension of those engaged in these activities must be international and... many police
actions will incorporate a number of covert phases, which will increasingly take place
abroad.117
While in the post-Cold War world "international legal tolerance for covert
114. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
115. One particularly insightful observation was that exposed secret operations may - on the basis
oftheirsecrecy - become more newsworthy than if the same action had taken place in the open. REISMAN
AND BAKER, supra note 2, at 137.
116. Id. at 136-37.
117. Id. at 138.
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operations may decline precipitously,""' and "fundamental changes in the
domestic constitutive process" suggest that "more cooks [e.g., members of
Congress] will be trying to make each covert stew," 1 9 Reisman and Baker
conclude with the "prognosis of a repetitive series of sequences: practice,
crusade against the practice, resumption of the practice."120 Since coercive
covert operations are not likely to vanish from the policy maker's inventory
of tools, the authors conclude with "a decalogue of executive guidelines for
planning and implementing particular covert operations."121 Among the most
important of these are suggestions that nations attempt "to accomplish overtly
what subordinates propose to do covertly"; never commit to refrain from all
covert action; "eschew secrecy for its own sake"; only accomplish overtly
lawful acts covertly; employ retrospective and judgmental congressional
oversight; and "[iln contemplating any covert operation .... assume that it
will become public knowledge much sooner than you would like and decide
if you can live with the consequences before you discover you have to. ""2
As a scholar who has spent much of the past decade trying to train
lawyers to work effectively in the national security process, I was particularly
delighted to see the authors' suggestion that the covert operations business
"requires that lawyers who have the necessary background, but who are not
in the direct chain of command[,] have an opportunity to submit their written
views, which become part of the record.""2 The list includes other excellent
advice, which the authors discuss more fully. This chapter alone is worth the
price of the book for anyone seriously involved in the business of covert
operations; but, as indicated earlier, Regulating Covert Action is a
tremendously valuable resource for a far broader readership than the title
might suggest. In addition, public curiosity about these activities remains such
that no major public library collection will be complete without this volume.
It is highly recommended. 24
118. Id.
119. Id. at 139.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 140.
122. Id. at 140-43.
123. Id. at 142.
124. One final comment may be in order. Like Professor Rummel's Death by Government, supra
note 83, and scores of other valuable works (including, it might be observed, scholarship published in this
Journal; see, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Paradoxes in the Revolution of the Rule of Law, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 239
(1994)), research for this book was funded in part by the U.S. Institute of Peace - an organization
recently identified as a possible target for defunding. See Robert S. Greenberger, Obscure Peace Institute
Is a Perfect Example Of Targets for GOP's Budget-Cutting Efforts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1995, at A12.
As a former officer of the Institute, I am hardly a neutral observer. But I strongly believe that public
money spent promoting scholarship of this caliber is money well spent.
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